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ABSTRACT
Linguists often resist data that undermines the dominant paradigm to which
they adhere. This paper examines split anaphors in Circassian, a language of
the Caucasus, as a case study of such rejection.
A typology of counterexamples is devised and contrastively applied to
physics and to linguistics, with etTortsmade to cite examples from each field.
The split anaphor case is presented as an error in prediction and hence as a
refutation of the Government and Binding paradigm. Its treatment is contrasted
with that of the orbit of Mercury, a comparable error in prediction of Newto-
nian mechanics.
A symmetry-breaking approach is taken to the problem of split anaphor (in
which reflexivesare ergativewhile reciprocals are anti-ergative).A new expla-
nation for ergativity is offered. This explanation predicts that only ergative
languages with a particular rule coupling will exhibit split ergativity.
1. INTRODUCTION
As anyone who has worked in linguistics can attest counter-examples have had a
distinctly weak role in the recent history of the field. Followers of Chomsky have
maintained that for a counter-example to have force, it must come with its own full
counter-theory. Curiously, Chomsky himself has always been more open to exam-
ining data on its own merits, but such distortions are not unusual in the history of
any field. In effect, this position taken by many of his students rules out virtually all
counter-examples of any interest. I shall argue that this position, never articulated
as far as I know in any formal document, is based upon an erroneous concept of the
scientific enterprise.
In effect this "Chomsky an" demand renders linguistics a doctrine rather than
a science. A careful examination of science, chiefly physics in my case, leads to a
number of distinctions between the verified assertions of a theory and those asser-
tions that fail to fall within the theory. The case is not one of binary-valued logic,
of true and false, but of finer shades of accord or conflict. I shall posit the following
distinctions in the logic of scientific inquiry:
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1. cognitive dscord (conflicting interpretations of central aspects of a theory,
including \\hether or not the theory "makes sense"),
2. anomalies (facts lying beyond a theory),
3. aberrations (facts that occur unexpectedly in familiar contexts),
4. lacunae (fa. :ts that the theory may yet explain or predict),
5. antinomies (incompatibilities between two ideas, perhaps within the same
theory),
6. antagonisti,: theories (incompatibilities between two theories), .
7. absences (lack of corroboration for a theory),
8. theoretical ~rrors (claims that are demonstrably errors in reasoning), and fi-
nally
9. errors of hct (predictions that are demonstrably false through counter-
example).
These various 10,~ical conditions have differing probative value for a particular
theory and are re lated in complex ways, not necessarily exclusive. Examples are
taken chiefly fron Iphysics to illustrate these, along with linguistic allusions where
possible.
In linguistics. as a case study, I shall examine the binding of overt anaphors
(reflexives and rei :iprocaJs) using data from Circassian, a language from the Cauca-
sus. The canonicl J account of such anaphors is widely viewed as correct: they are
not distinguished by syntax. Deviations from such behaviour should constitute an
incompleteness if. syntactic theory and require emendation or, where "fine tuning"
fails, a shift in pa 'adigm. In fact, when the deviant Circassian case was offered, its
significance was c lenied. Such denial of counter-examples and the limited vision of
the scientific met lOd in modern linguistics have robbed the field of a good deal of
logical or even pr )bative force.
2. UNASSAILAB ['E THEORY
Some time ago, i.1 the early years of Government and Binding (GB) Theory, at a
time when gener: Ltivistswere just beginning to branch out beyond English, I lis-
tened at a confere nce to a student of Chomsky discuss reflexives and reciprocals in
lroquoian languaj ~es.Hers was a good paper, but it simply confirmed the GB asser-
tion that these twe' forms fell into the one category of anaphors, with their difference
being merely sen Iantic. I pointed out to her the Circassian data with the anticipa-
tion that she wou d find them interesting and challenging, but was surprised to see
her dismiss my c )unter-examples out of hand. I replied that as counter-examples
they were proof 1hat something about anaphor theory was wrong. She countered
that without a fu II theoretical alternative, my counter-examples were worthless.
Why? Because, as she went on to explain, that was how science worked. Clearly
she had never de ne any science. Instead, what she was enunciating as received
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doctrine, never published as far as I can tell, was an extension of Chomsky's early
caveat that generative syntax in its founding years was incomplete and modest in
its achievements if still great in its promise and ambitions, and therefore deserved
some forbearance of its shortcomings. The precedent offered for this position was
that of classical or Newtonian mechanics, which in its early years was unable to
account for the precession of Mercury, but nonetheless was followed because its
successes elsewhere made a case that the theory was promising.
This early appeal for patience was reasonable, because extension, modifica-
tions, and reinterpretations in a theory can enlarge its capacity in unpredictable
ways. The later position was not. While scientists show career inertia much like
any other profession (as with, say, behaviourist psychology, which was long prac-
ticed after Chomsky effectively refuted its basic tenets), a refutation is a serious
challenge. It is not a notice of a mere incompleteness. The practitioner must take it
seriously and modify her theory so as to accommodate it, or if such accommodation
is impossible, then she must abandon the theory at least in a provisional manner and
seek an alternative. In short she claimed that a counter-example demanded an al-
ternative theory, either whole or in part, but that without such an alternative, the
counter-example itself lacked any force. This was supposedly not a mere opera-
tional requirement, one needed to keep the scientist from despair, but rather part of
the logic of science.
This encounter reflects merely one misconception of science once widely held
in linguistics circles. In fact, a full scrutiny of science, here of necessity brief, draw-
ing parallels between physics, the hardest of sciences, and linguistics, might help
the linguist understand the force and value of much current work. The analysis
is organized upon a provisional typology of difference and discord in the scien-
tific effort.
3. COGNITIVE DISCORD
In physics competing paradigms are usually competing conceptual models of func-
tioning mathematical theories that in themselves differ for the most part only in de-
tail. Perhaps the most familiar example of dispute over interpretation is that of the
probabilistic interpretation of wave mechanics in quantum theory (Sudbery 1986:
178-226). This pitted Max Born, Werner Heisenberg, and Niels Bohr, who ad-
vocated a probabilistic interpretation of the wave theory of matter, against Albert
Einstein, Erwin SchrOdinger (who discovered the first wave equation), Louis de
Broglie, and David Bohm, all of whom sought a more conventional materialistic
interpretation of matter waves. Related to this dispute was that of determinism as
opposed to indeterminism in quantum mechanics generally, typified by the long
dialogues of Einstein and Bohr (Hoffmann and Dukas 1975: 182-200). Interpre-
tive disputes have been central to almost all of generative grammar and much of
the progress in the field has come from finding interpretations that have led to
deeper insights.
25
LINGUISTICA Al LANTICA
4. CAUSALISM 1,ND FORMALISM
No. 25, 2004
Perhaps the most extreme form of cognitive discord was exhibited early in the his-
tory of modern physics and involved the concept of action at a distance. This dispute
took place betwet n Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz. Both men had invented the
calculus indepem ,ently. Newton had also invented dynamics and posited the law of
gravity, which WllS written down as an "inverse square law." Newton was able to
calculate orbits ar d explain astronomical dynamics, but at the expense of permitting
two bodies to act upon one another from a distance, with no intervening medium
to transmit force, Leibniz rejected this action at a distance as an absurdity, even
though in 1600 V'iIIiam Gilbert had anticipated force acting through a distance in
his work on magnetism (Mason 1956: 194-195). To Leibniz Newton's theory was
incoherent, even [hough he, like Newton, accepted the effectiveness of the math-
ematics. The ma(hinery and results of Newton's gravitational theory were not in
dispute; rather th e theory was seen as being incomprehensible in a fundamental
cognitive way. N ~wton had no answer for Leibniz except that the theory worked
(Alexander 1956: xviii-xx; Ross 1984: 41). He deliberately refrained from articu-
lating an underlyi ng cause (Cohen 1980: 79). This dispute might be termed that of
causalism versus formalism, shown in the demand of Leibniz for a comprehensible
cause behind the mathematical formalisms in contrast to the acceptance by Newton
that the formal m. tthematics alone was sufficient to explain phenomena and produce
more science. It '~as a divide between what could be termed cognitively accessi-
ble theories and. nathematically productive theories. It persists in physics to this
day (Frankel 199'7: xxii-xxiii; Holton 1978: 84-110; Omnes 1994: 92-100), where
some works have a distinctly causal tone, as for example, Bohm (1989), while oth-
ers are archly for nal, as with Mackey (1963). Progress in physics has been linked
to the elaboration and development of formalism.
The most irr portant linguistic parallel is Chomsky's initial challenge to the
structuralist to gc beyond the data to explain them in terms of universal language
competence. Cho nsky would have been a causalist. Progress in linguistics has been
the mirror image of that in physics: it has followed the demand for ever wider and
more general exp !anations of grammatical pattern,
5.INCOMPLETINESS
After disputes of interpretation the most common feature of science is incomplete-
ness: the existenc e of facts or phenomena that the theory has not yet explained, but
may yet explain 0 [ predict. Most, if not all, theories are incomplete. Normal science
(in the Kuhnian s' :nse) is driven by the expansion of theory and the concomitant in-
clusion of new pt enomena.
At this stagt of scientific progress, in the early stages of a paradigm, poor
matches between theory and fact are tolerated in hopes of eventual elucidation
within an enlargt d theory. This tolerance has typified most linguistic work, from
the S(tandard) Tlheory), to the E(xtended) ST, to the R(evised) EST, to Govern-
26
COLARUSSO Counter-Examples in Linguistics (Science)
ment and Binding (GB), to Minimalism.
Certainly this is a reasonable position. In the history of physics the case of
classical mechanics exhibits an anomaly in the precession of the orbit of Mercury.
I shall return to this below. Maintaining the Newtonian agenda eventually led in the
19th century to Maxwell's electromagnetic theory. Similarly, in the 20th century
early quantum mechanics could not explain hyperfine spectral lines, but holding
steadfast to the new paradigm eventually led to the discovery of spin and an expla-
nation of the these lines.
6. LIMITS
Some theories stipulate the limits of their applicability. These may not be apparent
at first, but can emerge as the theory matures. Within linguistics, most semanticists
assume that connotative meaning at the level of idiolects lies beyond the powers
of analysis. In physics, two famous examples are that of general relativity, which
predicts singularities where the theory itself no longer works (Hawking and El-
lis 1973: 256-298; Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler 1973: 934-940; Penrose 1972:
69-71; Wald 1984: 211-242), and quantum mechanics, which, in the uncertainty
principle, invokes complementarity between certain measurements, such as posi-
tion and momentum (Cohen-Tannoudji, Diu and Laloe 1977: 50; Liboff 1980: 52,
68; Schiff 1955: 8). More general but less recognized is the fact that all physics the-
ories are "effective" theories (Kane 2000: 40-52), that is they work only within a
certain range of reality. I shall also return to this principle when I discuss Mercury.
7. ANOMALIES
Some facts seem simply to lie beyond a theory. These are not merely cases of a
theory being incomplete, but rather are cases where the data are so strange as to
offer little prospect that the current paradigm will ever explain them. Such anoma-
lies tend to be ignored by all but the most adventurous practitioners, because they
bear the unwelcome tidings that a current paradigm must be wholly revised or even
replaced.
In linguistics the best example is that of ergative languages in a paradigm
that utilizes subject and object licensing (subject in "nominative", object in "ac-
cusative"), since ergative languages do not license subjects with a uniform case
assignment. As long as a syntactic theory adheres to a configurational definition of
subject as an external argument to a predicate no natural account of ergativity will
be available.
Examples abound in the history of physics. In classical mechanics a contain-
ment potential contains anything within it (drop a marble into a cup and it stays
there). In quantum mechanics, however, objects can tunnel through such potentials
(Brandt and Dahmen 1995: 84-86, fig. 5.6; Cohen-Tannoudji et al., 1977: 37,74,
357). The high-energy jets observed issuing from some black holes are really not
understood, though these are assumed to be due to an electromagnetic effect. Dark
,,~~,,
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matter is requirec to account for galactic dynamics. It is not at all understood, never
having been dire ;tly detected (Rowan-Robinson 1977: 136, sect. 14), but it is as-
sumed to arise flom group (symmetry) splitting within superstring or "D-brane"
theory (Kane 20(10:29; Penrose 2004: 772-778).
Facts can occur l nexpectedly in places a theory might stipulate as inappropriate or
impossible conte I(ts.Such "aberrations" are much like anomalies, but suggest that
the accepted pan digm has been unduly restrictive in some way.
Perhaps the ;implest example from linguistics is the English past-passive par-
ticiple (PPP), wt ich can show ergative-like behaviour. Not all PPPs have active
counterparts, as \ lith "sodden mess" as opposed to *"1 sod( ded) the mess'.' "Mess"
behaves more Iile the subject of an intransitive verb. The PPPs in English, even
those that have I:orresponding active verbs, more closely resemble ergative NPs
wherein the fulfillment of transitivity is reflected by the absolutive licensing of the
argument exhibil ing the effects of that verb (subject of intransitives, direct object
of transitives) (C )larusso 1992: 182-185).
Physics too ;hows aberrations. These can be of familiar phenomena in unex-
pected settings, as with high-temperature superconductivity. Superconductivity, al-
beit a complex pllenomenon, was well understood, but its correlate above a few de-
grees Kelvin has resisted thorough understanding for almost twenty years now. An
aberration can al ;0 be a familiar phenomenon in an unexpected theoretical frame-
work, such as the dependence on a frame of reference of a body radiating in general
relativity. A charged object falling into a black hole would experience no acceler-
ation within its own reference frame other than the gravity of the black hole on
that frame and s!l would give off no light, but seen from a distance it appears to
be undergoing acceleration and would accordingly glow (Peierls 1979: 160-- 166).
Such an effect hi IS not been witnessed, but sets familiar thermodynamic effects in
a novel context, iO that their very nature becomes problematical. Finally, we can
group here those effects where a novel phenomenon occurs in an unexpected en-
vironment. One!)f these is the positronium (e+ or positron with e- the electron)
"atom." Theory! lredicted that such an odd "element" should occur and this was
confirmed. It wa~ an aberration, however, when it was found inside a metal (Peierls
1979: 137-146).
Conceptual incol npatibilities can occur at the level of the model of a phenomenon
or the interpretat ion of a theory. These might be termed "antinomies." Similar ef-
fects at the level of logic are termed paradoxes. Perhaps the best example in lin-
guistics comes flom semantics, where the apparatus for word meaning and that or
sentential meanillg stand in radical opposition (Allan 2001: 41-74, 381-417), and
yet dictionaries demonstrate through paraphrasing of word meanings that semantic
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equivalence between the two levels is fundamental to language.
The best-known incompatibility between two ideas in physics is that of the
wave-particle duality in quantum mechanics, although there are many other such
dualities (Sen 1968). The photoelectric effect proves that light is made of particles
because when shone onto a metal these photons knock off electrons of correspond-
ing energy. Yet light also shows interference and diffraction, and so must be a wave.
While it is possible to derive particle-like behaviour from waves (Wald 1994: 46-
52), or to represent a particle by waves (Arfken 1985: 481-485; Hassani 1999:
204, sect. 8.1.5), the mathematical facts do not seem to sway causalist sensibilities
and have led to bizarre and novel interpretations (Everett 1973). In classical me-
chanics the best example is that of determinism as opposed to chaos (Richtmeyer
1981, vol. 2: 276-311). The first example of indeterminate behaviour was that of
the 3-body problem (Goldstein 1980: 61, fn. t; Mainzer 2004: 52-55). Historically
it underlay the feud between Newton and John Flamsteed the Astronomer Royal
regarding the position of the moon's rising (Christianson 1984: 365-372). What
Newton calculated Flamsteed failed to find, because in fact the moon's exact orbit
was indeterminate.
10. THEORETICAL INCOMPATIBILITIES
Conceptual conflicts are also frequent in science, but these usually occur during
periods of crisis in science and result in one concept replacing another through its
enthronement at the heart of a new paradigm. Sometimes it seems that linguistic
debates consist almost wholly of such incompatibilities, but the best one is that
exhibited by Chomsky himself in the 1970s in which he argued for a genetic basis of
the language capacity while denying that language had any significant phylogeny.
In physics a little recognized conceptual incompatibility was that of size. In
classical mechanics there was no express limit on how small elements of the world
could be, atoms being made of smaller articles and these of yet smaller ones ad in-
finitum, whereas in quantum mechanics there was assumed to be an absolute limit
on smallness or fineness (Dirac 1958: 3-4). From this new assumption one could
derive the principle of complementarity and indeterminacy: a system is absolutely
small if it cannot be observed without the act of observation altering it. Another ex-
ample is of the continuous nature of general relativity, wherein phenomena change
smoothly as opposed to quantum mechanics, more specifically quantum gravity,
where discontinuities characterize small-scale events (Hawking and Penrose 1996:
61-73).
11. THE BOUNDARIES OF A THEORY
The sustained effort of science is devoted to the expansion of that which can be
explained. Esthetic sensibilities also seek links or even identity among seemingly
disparate phenomena. This is the beauty of science; this is how it offers insight.
Of course, the expansion of a theory must be conducted so as to avoid theoreti-
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cal incompatibili[ies by either limiting the extent of the domain to be explained
or, in a seeming (ontrary manner, including more phenomena. For example, within
physics, quanturr: mechanics expanded its explanatory capacity to deal successfully
with the absolutey small, but also insured its correctness by reaching classical me-
chanics in the lirr it as Planck's constant became insignificant, that is, quantum me-
chanics became (Iassical in the limit of large sizes. Analogously, general relativity
produced Newtoliian celestial mechanics at speeds far below those of light, c.
A crucial an, I characteristic aspect of the program of normal science, particu-
larly in physics, s twofold: the deduction of predictions from mathematical laws,
the predictive pm ver of science, and the explanation of existing data in terms of well
understood, and familiar patterns, the explanatory power of science. Apart from
generating unexI' ected parallels and equivalencies, the mathematics of physics has
one other crucial consequence: it renders truth as equivalent to fit. A theory is con-
sidered true to the extent that the data match its mathematical assertions. For this
reason approxim Itions occupy a central role in much of physics. "Fit" can even
exhibit substantid latitude, as for example when an "infinite constant" is taken to
be zero (Lawrie. 990: 133). There is no other way to verify a physics theory. Two
further conseque Ices arise from this aspect. First, any given physics theory applies
only within a cer :ain range of reality, of size, energy, mass, etc. This is what Kane
(2000: 9, 40-52) means by a theory being effective. Second, the process of match-
ing data also enta ils tolerances between the numbers generated by theory and those
found in the labo :atory. Generally, what is considered a tolerable error is related to
the overall scale of the theory, to its "range of reality." These can be quite close,
even when dealir g with celestial mechanics, but the error that would be dismissed
in celestial mech anics as negligible is many orders of magnitude greater than its
correlate in quantum mechanics. Reductionism has muddied the waters here. Just
because one thee ry creates inputs for another, that is, just because one deals with
a smaller scale tllat feeds into a larger one does not imply that the larger is some
sort of illusionar: I vision of the smaller, a mere artifact of the smaller. In so far as a
theory exhibits all acceptable fit within its range of reality, just so does it represent
that range of real ity. The macroscopic world at low velocities and low gravities re-
ally is Newtoniall because it behaves in a Newtonian fashion. Theories, on smaller
scales (quantum. nechanics), or higher ones (general relativity) must show good fit
in their range of .eality, but must also grade over into the Newtonian system when
their math deals. Nith values characteristic of the Newtonian range. If they fail this
limiting test, the!I they cannot be correct no matter how successful they might be
within their own ranges.
Linguistic theory quite lacks this feature of scale. It has modules that must in-
terface, and thesl might be viewed as rough analogues to the hierarchy of theories
seen within physics, but throughout linguistics theories might be said to be digital
and Boolean: the y have elements that simply define one another through hierarchy
and precedent, c mectly or incorrectly. The only fuzziness linguistics has lies in
the judgment of f peakers, where forms may be ranked in terms of acceptability, but
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here too context often serves to reintroduce a true - false (acceptable - unaccept-
able) dichotomy.
12. ERRORS
Despite the best efforts of its practitioners any theory can be shown to have claims
that are demonstrable errors in reasoning. Mistakes are a part of any effort; they
are the noise of thinking. Linguistics journals have numerous examples of articles
that come to conclusions based on data that actually support the opposite thesis,
while others spin out theoretical claims that upon further reflection can be seen to
be unsupported.
Physics has its share of errors too. Most people have heard of the study that
proved that bumblebees cannot fly. Less familiar is one that argued that a mountain
could not exceed 5,000 meters in height without exploding. Even more obscure
is the fact that the hidden variable interpretation of quantum mechanics, which
interprets quantum waves as statistical entities (Bohm 1989: 29, 114-115,622-623;
Gell-Mann 1964: 169-172), can be shown to make false predictions in spectra and
chemistry (Bethe and Jackiw 1968: 25-26). More troubling, however, is the fact
that the hidden variable theory also predicts non-locality in quantum mechanical
interactions (Peierls 1979: 25-29), and there is indeed new data to suggest that this
is possible. So, this line of theoretical reasoning may yet be vindicated.
Theories fail, however, because of three chief problems:
13. CLUTTER
Science is driven substantially by elegance. Too many "elementary" particles (Cheng
and O'Neill 1979: 22,23,25,26, tables VII-XI) led to the acceptance of the quark
model (Sudbery 1986: 15, table 1.2). A comparable development within linguis-
tics would be the adoption of generative grammar. Taxonomic linguistics with its
tagmemic account of syntax was simply too messy.
14. ABSENCES
Lack of corroboration for a theory leads to its eventual abandonment. I can think
of no cases in linguistics where a failure to find a predicted phenomenon led to a
paradigm shift, but physics exhibits several such examples. First, much money was
spent over several decades to find the elusive top/truth-quark, with the quark model
being finally vindicated only in 1984 with the final discovery of the heaviest quark.
To date, however, there has been no experimental evidence for another cornerstone
of theoretical physics, super-symmetry, wherein matter particles and energy parti-
cles should each have their energy - matter opposites, (Kane 2000: 72-97), and
should it fail to appear in its expected energy range, the quandary in physics will
be severe (Kaku 1988: 17). Such a development might be comparable to the failure
to detect the decay of the proton after much time, effort, and money. This led to
the abandonment of the GUTs (Grand Unified Theories) and to renewed interest
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in string/(mem)t rane theories (Bailin and Love 1994: 142-148; Kaku 1988: 376;
Polchinsky 1998. vol. 2: 355-356), although some superstring writers were slow to
abandon this prelliction (Green, Schwarz and Witten 1987, vol. 2: 499,520).
15. ERRORS IN PREDICTION
Theoretical predctions that are demonstrably false by counter-example occupy a
.preeminent posit ion in the logic of science, although not in biology. Many would
say that if a the<Iry cannot be refuted, then it is not a scientific theory. One such
refuted claim ininguistics would be that languages with a high inflectional index
tend to be lost a~ opposed to those exhibiting transparency, that tend to spread. A
superficial knowi edge of the Altaic family will convince the linguist that the highly
inflected langual:es of this family also achieve transparency and have spread at
the expense of al nost every other language they have encountered. The theoretical
prediction, high inflection - opacity, is false. The other obvious example is that of
anaphors. One e;:ample from physics put forward to promote a spirit of tolerance
has been that of 1he orbit of Mercury, as mentioned above (sections 4, 7, 8). I shall
now examine thi!, "paradigm" of forbearance in detail.
16. MERCURY', ORBIT
Newton derived I~epler's laws, particularly the one regarding the elliptical nature of
planetary orbits (Bressoud 1991: 4-16). Even in his Principia of 1686 (vol. 2: 576,
sect. 30) Newtor anticipates that these orbits will be subject to torques from the
gravity of the oth er planets. Accordingly their aphelia and perihelia (points farthest
and closest to th< sun) will be subject to shifting. A planet in its orbit is a rotating
object albeit witl its axis of rotation outside its body, but the whole is still subject
to wobbling just like a toy top. This wobble is due to a "perturbation" term in the
potential energy )f the orbit (Goldstein 1950: 509-512). This term represents the
gravitational attr; lctions of the other planets. The term "perturbation" itself flags
the effect as bein, ~near the limits of the fit for an effective theory. The best account
of the history of this perturbation is to be found in Weinberg (1972: 14-15). The
discrepancy in Nercury's orbit was not discovered until the work of Jean Joseph
LeVerrier in 1845, nearly two centuries after Newton's prediction of the effect.
LeVerrier observl:d that the precession in the perihelion of Mercury was 38" (sec-
onds of arc )/centl try faster than Newton's theory predicted from the known planets,
Even his discovery (independently with John Couch Adams) of Neptune in 1846
did not offer suff cient new mass in the solar system to explain this counter fact to
Newtonian celesl ia! mechanics, These two years saw the first serious doubts cast
upon Newtonian mechanics along with a splendid validation of it: Neptune's exis-
tence was predicl ed on the basis of irregularities in the orbit of Uranus. LeVerrier
began to search f,)r other planets between Mercury and the Sun, unsuccessfully. In
1882 Simon Newcomb corrected LeVerrier's reading to 43"/century. In 1895, only
50 years after LeVerrier's finding, Simon Newcomb suggested that Newton's the-
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ory was wrong. Both LeVerrier and then Newcomb had spent the intervening fifty
years trying in vain to find missing planets, clouds of mass, and such. One H. H.
Seeliger put forward in 1896 an extremely elaborate theory of clouds of dust (asso-
ciated with the zodiacal light) that did explain Newcomb's finding. This seems to
have satisfied Newcomb, but still within twenty years (1916) Einstein put forward
his theory of general relativity. The calculation of Mercury's precession is most
easily seen by assuming what is called a Schwarzschild metric (Callahan 2000:
426-432; Misner et aI., 1973: 1110-1116), also published in 1916, but not used by
Einstein. The effect is due to an extra term in the orbital equation resulting from
the Einstein field equations. The term has a small value given the masses in the
solar system and the relativistic effect is accordingly tiny, 42" .56 :I: 0" .94 out of
a total of 5599" .74:1: 0" AI, with the vast majority due to Newtonian effects of
inertial frames of observation and planetary torques (Misner et aI., 1973: 1113, box
40.3). 43" of arc/century is a minute shift, especially since Mercury executes 415
orbits per century (Callahan 2000: 430). This tiny effect is not due to torque, but
arises directly from the geometric distortion of space-time. This precession of 43"
of arc/century is an example of a limiting effect, where an effective theory of high
energies, general relativity, has a slight trailing off at the lower energy regime of
Newtonian mechanics (sect. 6).
The case of the Circassian anaphors bears no resemblance to that of the pre-
cession of the perihelion of the orbit of Mercury. Neither did practitioners respond
to Mercury's anomalous orbit in the way that my anonymous linguistic adversary
did to the Circassian data. Doubts emerged immediately and a sustained search for
an explanation was undertaken. Their effort formed one stream in what was to lead
to one of the greatest revolutions of paradigm in the history of science. Let me con-
clude, nonetheless, in the spirit of science by trying to sketch an explanation for
these troubling linguistic data.
17. SPLIT ANAPHORS IN CIRCASSIAN
Anaphors, reflexives and reciprocals, are both bound in their governing category
(Haegeman 1991: 222-223), and with the known exception of propositional phrases
("They took pictures of themselves/of one another") are generally viewed as a well-
established feature of syntax. They and their governing category have survived the
shift from GB to Minimalism (Radford 1997: 114-116). In fact anaphors are part of
one of the best aspects, in the sense of predictive force, of modern linguistic theory,
entering into a typology of NPs (Haegeman 1991: 453; Radford, 1997: chaps. 3
and 4).
In the various forms of Circassian, a group of languages and dialects native to
the North West Caucasus, anaphors are bound in a conventional fashion. These lan-
guages distinguish, however, between reflexives and reciprocals at a morphological
level and at a syntactical one as well. They split their anaphors, and hence I propose
to call them and others like them split anaphor languages.
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1Examples frol n Bzhedukh West Circassian, with surface forms of verbs in brackets at
the end of the line. Abbreviations used:
By contrast recip 'ocals fall into an "anti-ergative" pattern of syntax and verbal con-
cord (3).
Reflexives behav ~like any other R -expression ("referential expression," nouns, pro-
nouns, etc.), as ill (2).
(2) Ergative rej !exive syntax and verbal concord:
a. S-erg O-abs o-s-V:
lI.'~-n; y~zYa-r z~-qa-y~-lI.a\,o~-zY~-\,a [z~qill.ay"fzY~\,]
man-J:RG self-ABS self-HOR-3-see-back-PAST
'The Inan saw himself.'
b. Say~7Ya-r z~-qa-s-l\.al(~-zY~-\,a [zgqrsl\.(iy"fzY~\,]
1 sel'~ABS self-HOR-I-see-back-PAST
'I sa\\ myself.'
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indirect object
noun pharse
oblique
past tense
plural
reciprocal
reciprocal trace
subject, as verbal index
subject
a general trace
thematic vowel
verb
verb
10
NP
OBL
PAST
PL
REC
REC.TR
S
S
t
THM.VWL
v
V
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al'solutive, in verbal inflection
al'solutive
al :ent, as verbal index
a!:ent
ccusative
dltive
di rect object, as verbal index
di rect object
er gative, in verbal inflection
eqative
h( ,rizon of interest
in :ransitive
in jex trace
in jirect object, as verbal index
abs
ABS
ag
AG
CAUS
DAT
do
DO
erg
ERG
HOR
INTRANS
fND.TR
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Circassian i:; ergative, with pronouns showing ergative verb concord (la) and
nouns showing ergative case marking as well (l b): 1
(I) Ergativity:
a. SOc -soY [ergative morphology, -qa- omitted]:
sa wa wg-qa-s-l\.ay"a-\,a
1 yo I you-HoR-I-see-PAsT
'I say' you.'
b. SO c-s-V [ergative case marking]:
l<;~-rr ~a-ha-r l/l-qa-y~-l\.a\,o~-\,a-ha
man-I ~RGdog-PL-ABS 3(dogs)-HOR-3(man)-see-PAST-PL
'The nan saw the dogs.'
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(3) Anti-ergative reciprocal syntax and verbal concord:
a. S (0) s-o-V:
ta f tg-q;::>-zara-l\a1°g-a-zYg-1a [tgqgz£nJl.fi1°rzY;}1]
we (REC.TR) we-HOR-REc-see-INTRANS-back-PAST
'We saw one another.'
b. S-abs (0) s-o-Y:
lI.'g-ha-r! 0-qg-zara-lI.a1°a-zYg1a-ha [qgz£f£lI.fi1°rzY;}1ax']
man-PL-ABS (REC.TR) 3-HOR-REc-see-back-PAST-PL
'The men saw one another.'
The constructions in (3) exhibit the anti-ergative patterns used by these languages
to denote actions where transitivity has been reduced (4b) (Colarusso 1992: 177),
or where the subject is low animacy/volition (4d-e) (p. 184).
(4) Anti-ergative constructions:
a. sOgz-gm :faana-ha-r 0-qa-yg-dg-1a-ha [qid;}1ax']
woman-OBL shirt-PL-ABS 3(PL)-HOR-3-sew-PAsT-PL
'The woman sewed the shirts [completed action].'
b. sOgz-ar :faana-ha-m-a 0-q-y-ha-a-d-a-1a [qfidfi1]
woman-ABS shirt-PL-OBL-PL 3-HOR-3-PL-at-sew-INTRANS-PAST
'The woman was busy sewing at the shirts [incomplete action].'
c. lI.'g-m PSg+xOg-m ~a-ha-r
man-ERG water+ftow-OBL dog-PL-ABS
0-q-0-yg-y;::>-t~aAa-1a-ha [qgrit~£Aa16x']
3(PL)- H0 R-3(river)- in-3-drown- PAST-PL
'The man drowned the dogs in the river.'
d. (*)pSg+xOg-m ~a-ha-r 0-qa-yg-t~aAa-1a-ha [qit~£Aa16x']
water+ftow-ERG dog-PL-ABS 3(PL)-HOR-3-drown-PAsT-PL
'The river drowned the dogs.'
e. ~a-ha-r PSg+xOg-m 0-0-s'Y-yg-t~aAa-1a-ha [s'Yit~£Aa16x']
dog-PL- ABS water+ftow-OB L 3(PL)-3(river)-there-3(river)-drown-PAsT -PL
'The river drowned the dogs.'
f. ~a-ha-r PSg+xOg-m 0-0-xa-t~aAa-1a-ha [x£t~£Aa16x']
dog-PL- ABS water+ftow-OB L 3(PL)-3(river)-in.a.mass-drown-PAsT -PL
'The dogs drowned in the river.'
In (4d) the subject is low animacy with ergative syntax and concord, but it is
marginally acceptable. By contrast (4e) has intransitive syntax with the logical sub-
ject as an indirect object. It retains ergative verbal concord, but also reflects the
demoted subject by an adverbial deictic adjunct, /-I/J-s'Y -/ -3-there-. So constructed
(4e) is fully acceptable, as is (41), its simple intransitive correlate. The relevance of
(41) will become apparent at the end of this paper. For now one should note that the
deictic adjunct in (4e) is in a concord slot between the direct object and the indirect
object (if any) and subject, that is the concord order is as in (5):
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(5) DIRECT.OB IECT-HORIZON- ADJUNCTS- INDIRECT. OBJECT-SUBJECT-CAUSAL.
AGENT-CAlISAL.PREFIX-ROOT-
Note too that low animacy subjects cannot take the horizon of interest prefix /-q(a)-
/, since this impl es a deliberate verifiable action that affects the subject's interests
in the absolutive )bject. Low animacy subjects do not meet the criteria for horizon.
As arcane as thes ~points are, they will prove to be the explanation for the reciprocal
forms in (3).
Ihypothesiz ~that the Circassian reciprocal is distinct from the reflexive only
at morphological level, and that syntactic effects are secondarily due to a constraint
that forces the seJltence into accord with the morphology. By the limits principle of
section 6, I think that what this language is doing is showing elaborate argument
effects that in thi:; one case also spill over in a specific way into syntax.
18. MORPHOL('GICAL ARGUMENTS
Verbs seem to c~rry overt argument structure that for many of them can vary by
valence. Somethi Ilg like the GB projection principle determines the syntactic role
such verbs may fi11.The syntax then offers adjuncts, though the constraints on what
adjuncts can go Vlithwhich verbs is below the argument level of denotative seman-
tics, and is closer to the level of connotative semantics. Many Circassian verbs have
morphological arguments (obligatory inflections). Contrast (6b) with (6c). These
need not have s}ntactic correlates, but when they do these are syntactically ad-
juncts (6a).
(6) Morphologil'al arguments:
a. S 10 s .io-Y:
s'~z-a,r ?ana-m 0-y~-s'~-\,a [yus'u\']
woma l-THM. VWL-ABS table-OBL she-it.on-dance-PAsT
'The v 'oman danced on the table.'
b. S s-io- Y:
s';)z-a.r 0-y~-s'~-\,a [yus'u\']
womall-THM. VWL-ABS she-it.on-dance-PAsT
'The v 'oman danced.'
c. S 10 s V:
*S'~z-a-r 0-f~-\,a [S'u\'a]
womall- THM. VWL-ABS she-dance-PAsT
'The \I 'oman danced.'
The example; in (6) suggest that morphology takes precedence over syntax in
Circassian, more specifically, that morphological inflection is primary. The "per-
sonal indices" sh)w no evidence of being clitics, save for the benefactive (Co-
larusso, 2006: 26, ex. 33b). They are direct expressions of the semantics of the
verb. They may IIe termed "inferred arguments". That is, someone must dance
somewhere and while obligatory morphologically, they may be omitted as words.
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Only a few sentential adjuncts seem to emerge from a process of copying a coref-
erential personal index onto the verb. These all fall between the initial absolutive
index and any subsequent oblique argument indices that may precede the verb root
(Colarusso, 1992: 74, ex. 134; Colarusso, 2006: 20-22, ex. 30-31).
19. INDEX SCRAMBLING
In (7b-c) reciprocals force the syntax into anti-ergative patterns. A di-transitive,
(7b), shows that this process is a morphological transformation or "mutation" if one
wishes a different term for this level of grammar, although formally the process is
no different from that in syntax (Colarusso 1992: 110-114; Colarusso, 2006: 26,
ex. 33). The structure of (7b) is that of (7c), where the trace of the original subject
index before the verb root is marked with a causative marker, /-y,a-/, since this is
the only fashion for marking a four-argument verb, as in (7d).
(7) Circassian di-transitives:
a. S 10 DO do-io-s- Y:
lI.'~-ha-m-a ~r~z~-ha-m-a tx~JI.-ha-r
man-PL-OBL-PL woman-PL-OBL-PL book-PL-ABS
0-q~-y+ha-a-y+ha-t'~-1(a-ha [qCirCit'f1(ax']
3.PL-HOR - 3+PL-to-3+PL-give- PAST-PL
'The men gave the books to the women.'
b. S reciprocal.trace DO s-io-agent-causative- Y:
lI.'~-ha-r ! tx~JI.-ha-m-a
man-PL-ABS REC.TR book-PL-OBL-PL
l/l-q~-zara-y+ha-1(a-t'~-zY~-1(a-ha [q~zarCi1(at'izf1(ax']
3-HOR-REC-3+PL-CAus-give-back-PAST -PL
'The men gave the books back to one another.'
c. S reciprocal.traceJO DO(in oblique!) s-reciprocal.adjunct-do-!-cause- V
lI.'~-ha-r! tx~lI.-ha-m
man-PL-ABS NP-trace book-PL-OBL
[[s 0-]qg- [ADJ zara-] [DO y+ha-a-] [s Ha-] t'~-zYg-1(a-ha]
3.PL-HOR-REC-3+PL(books)-to- [ND.TR-cAus-give-back- PAST-PL
d. AG S 10 DO do-io-s-ag- Y:
sa JI.'~-ha-m-a sO~z~-ha-m-a tx~Jl.a-ha-r
1 man-PL-OBL-PL woman-PL-OBL-PL book-PL-ABS
l/l-qg-y+ha-a- y+ha-a-s-1(a-t'~-zY~-1(a-ha
[qO'[Q'z1(at'fzf1(ax']
3.PL-HOR-3+PL-to-3+PL- DAT-I-CAus-give-back-PAST -PL
'I made the men give the books back to the women.'
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20. REPEATED REFERENT
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The behaviour ill (7) is deviant from the predictions made about the unity of ana-
phors. It is also ;omplex and odd. I suggest that insight into the scrambling seen
in (7b) lies in thl: repeated reference suffix 1-'lLI 'back, again' that occurred in the
reflexives in (3) as well. This appears on a verb when an argument in a discourse
has been repeat( d (8a), or, more to my purposes, when a predicate has been re-
peated (8b).
(8) Repeated rf ference and /-'P -I:
a. Repe. lted argument:
J\.':H r s":ng-m 0-qa-y-a-psaaJ\.a-zY g-\,a [qe'psEJ\.tzf\'l
man-' ~HM.VWL-ABSwoman-OBL 3-HOR-3-to-speak-again-PAST
'The nan spoke to the woman again.'
b. Repe: lted predicate:
J\.'g-a.r 0-qa-sxg-zYg-\,a [qE'sxfzf\'l
man-' 'HM.VWL~ABS3-PL-HOR-eat-again-PAsT
'The nan ate again.'
21. THE ERGA':IVE PRECEDENCE PRINCIPLE
If we take the n ferent of a verb to be a predicate that has undergone a process
of symmetry bre lking whereby one of its arguments becomes external (to the left,
and assigned an absolutive), then we can represent the Circassian morphology in
this way. As a fi ~st step toward morphology (at the semantics-morphology inter-
face) the semant c predicate Pxy breaks its symmetry by assigning the absolutive
to the argument that fulfills the denotative semantics of P (the language is erga-
tive). I use 'I'm a symmetry breaking operator, thus Pxy ----> y.abs-IPx. In this I
have ordered the arguments after the predicate in order from agentive to patient,
so that the serna Hics of P's effect have as their denotative goal the rightmost ar-
gument, y. This I,recedence is the core semantic structure of an ergative language.
Animacy hierarc.lies, volition, horizon of interest, completeness of action all inter-
act with this prel :edence and cause variations from the canonical ergative pattern.
I term this the "I :rgative precedence principle." This is a semantic principle with
far-reaching effel :ts in morphology and syntax. Any intervening argument in a di-
transitive predic~ te has some semantic effects from the action, but does not fulfill
the predicate's a( tion.
22. DI-TRANSI1'IVE SHUFFLING
If my predicate II:vel analysis of ergativity is correct,. then we would expect move-
ment of NPs to hIve minor effects on transitivity. Notably, the sort of shuffling that
we see in di-tral1sitives in a language like English occurs also in Circassian, but
with relatively m nor effect (Colarusso 1992: 174). It is overshadowed by morpho-
logical effects. E 'en if an indirect object occurs before the verb, no index shuffling
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occurs and the sense is altered, as in English (9b), but with less force. It is the ab-
sence of the horizon of interest prefix /-q(a)-/ that signals a greater degree of effect
upon the woman; the man has relinquished his interest in the book (9c).
(9) Circassian di-transitive shuffling as a null-process:
a. )<•.';:)-m s";:)Z;:)-mtx;:)l\-a-r0-q-y-a-yg-t'g-¥a [qgri't\~¥]
man-OBLwoman-OBL book-THM.VWL-ABS3-HOR-3-to-3-give-PAsT
'The man gave the book to the woman.'
b. l\'g-m txgl\-a-r s";:)Z;:)-m 0-q-y-a-yg-t';:)-¥a [q;:)ri.t'::}¥]
man-OBLbook-THM.VWL-ABSwoman-OBL3-HOR-3-to-3-give-PAST
'The man gave the book to the woman.'
or
'The man loaned the woman the book.'
c. l\'g-m S";:)zg-m tx;:)l\-a-r 0-y-a-yg-t'g-¥a [(ye)ri"t'::)¥]
man-OBLwoman-OBLbook-THM.VWL-ABS3-3-to-3-give-PAST
'The man gave the woman the book.'
23. SYMMETRY BREAKING2
If the predicate is intransitive, then the process is merely Px ---+ x.abs-IP. To the
left of the arrow is a semantic structure with precedence among its arguments, but
where order, left to right or right to left, is merely an artifact of presentation; to
the right of the arrow is a morphological structure where an argument has assumed
the pre-root (language specific) position of an inflection. This morphological ob-
ject then controls a syntactic structure where the subject (external argument of the
syntax-tree) coincides with the absolutive external argument of the predicate.
If the predicate is transitive, then the process is Pxy ---+ y.ABS-IPx, and pro-
jection assigns [y] to the internal syntactic node, but the direct object retains its
absolutive marking. In other words, as an ergative language, its case marking does
not license the subject and object, but rather reflects the semantic argument assign-
ments at the predicate level. I summarize this dynamic in (10), where I use 'I' as
a boundary mark for symmetry breaking, with x.abs- marking the argument that
fulfills the verbal sense.
It is a detail of Circassian verb inflection that the personal indices all come
before the verb root, though this is common enough (French, Russian, Bantu lan-
guages all have similar patterns with pronominal ditics). One might wish to write
the semantic predicates as zyxP, and have symmetry breaking by transitive ful-
fillment as zlyxP, thereby collapsing the derivations in (lOb-c), but Pxyz is more
familiar from logic texts.
2( am indebted to Lyle Jenkins for suggesting to me that the ideas of symmetry and
symmetry breaking might be important in linguistics and not just in physics. The theoretical
machinery that I have set up in section 19 is entirely the product, however,of my own fancy
and Lyle bears no culpability for it.
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(10) Symmetry E reaking in an Ergative Language:
a. Intrar sitive predicate:
IPx -. x.abs-IP
b. Trans .tive predicate (2 cycles):
i.IPx:' -. y.abs-IPx
ii. y.a JS-IPX-. y.abs-Ix.obl-P (do-s- V)
c. Di-tn nsitive predicate (3 cycles):
i. Pxyz-. z.abs-IP-xy
ii. z.a Js-IPxy-' z.abs-y.obl-IPx
iii. Z.l bs-y.obl-IPx -. z.abs-y.obl-x.obl-IP (do-io-s-V)
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Thus, there s a fundamental difference in function between morphology and
syntax in an ergnive language like Circassian. Morphology is semantically driven
at a denotative Ie vel. Syntax obeys discourse criteria and connotative semantics.
24. REPEATED REFERENT PRINCIPLE
The only way in which "denotative morphology" is sensitive to discourse is when
one of its argum ~nts has a repeated referent within a governing category, that is
within a predicat~, IPxx, which leads to reftexive.abs-IP( -zY-)-x. Note that the pro-
jection principle must link morphological argument structure with the syntactical
argument structu'e through analogous case-markings.
Beyond the I:overning category connotative criteria allow the speaker to desig-
nate two predica es as forming essentially the same act, usually through common
direct objects: [D scourse IPxy ... IPxy] --t [0 y.abs-IP-x ... y.abs-IP-zY-x]. It is cru-
cial to understam. that in discourse the first predicate may be implied, and not overt,
as in (8b). This c,III be the case for either side of the arrow, the left being semantic,
and the right bei ilg morphological. I summarize the repeated reference principle
in (11).
(11) Repeated re"erent principle:
a. Simpl ~reference (predicate is co-extensive with governing category):
IPxx - -> reftexive.abs-IP(-zY)-x
b. Exten led reference (discourse domain can exceed governing category):
[DiscoIrSe IPxy ... IPxy] -. [0 y.abs-IP-x ... y.abs-IP(-zY)-x]
25. How RECII'ROCALS SATISFY THE REPEATED REFERENT PRINCIPLE
Such an implied antecedent seems to underlie reciprocals. One has [Discourse Pxy
... Pyx], for exalople, with P = see, this would be semantically 'x SEE y ... Y SEE
x, with no need f Jr more than one overt SEE. This sequence satisfies the repeated
referent principlt, but causes ambiguity with respect to the ergative precedence
principle. The transitivity is not reduced, as has sometimes been claimed as an ex-
planation for intr insitive reciprocals, as much as it has become doubled. Instead I
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assume that the transitive fulfillment of an argument precedes the repeated refer-
ence process (assignment of reflexives and reciprocals).
Using the predicate schemes in (10) and (11) we can now explain the behaviour
of 2-place and 3-place reciprocals (12). We need only add a pluralizing principle (a
reasonable discourse function, not in conflict with inherent plurals, {xi}) to consol-
idate arguments with multiple referents: If x and y found or implied in a discourse
can occupy the same slot in ergativity precedence, then they appear as a new plural
argument [x+y]. We can now see why (3) and (7b) work as they do.
(12) 2-Place and 3-Place Reciprocals under the Pluralizing Principle:
a. 2-Place:
i. Pluralizing:
[D Pxy ... Pyx] -+ P[x+y][x+y]
ii. Symmetry breaking by transitive fulfillment:
I P[x+y][x+y] -+ [x+y].abs-IP[x+y]
iii. Repeated referent:
[x+y].abs-IP[x+y] -+ [x+y].abs-IP(-zY)-reciprocal
iv. "Inferred argument":
[x+y].abs-IP(-n-REC -+ [x+y].abs-reciprocal.obl-IP(-z)
(s-io- V)
b. 3-Place:
i. Pluralizing:
[D Pxyz ... Pyxz] -+ P[x+y][y+x]z
ii. Symmetry breaking by transitive fulfillment:
IP[x+y][y+x]z -+ [x+y].abs-IP-[y+x]z
iii. Repeated referent:
[x+y].abs-IP-[y+x]z -+ [x+y].abs-IP(-zY)-reciprocal-z
iv. Inferred arguments (2 iterations)
[x+y].abs-I P(-zY)-reciprocal-z -+ [x+y].abs-z.obl-reciprocal.obl-IP( -zY)
(s-reciprocal.io-do-t- V)
Because transitive fulfillment precedes repeated referent, that is, because the re-
peated referent is derived, the simple personal index appears in the absolutive (ex-
ternal slot), while the anaphor, now an inferred argument, appears in the oblique.
By contrast, the reflexive cannot be inferred; this is why reciprocals and reflexives
are split in Circassian. One can imagine that in other ergative languages, transitive
fulfillment follows repeated referent, in which case anaphors are not split. Only
ergative languages can split anaphors. This phenomenon is linked to the inferred
morphological arguments of (6a-b), attesting to some modest explanatory force on
the part of this new theory.
26. MORPHOLOGICAL SHUF'FLING OF 3-PLACE RECIPROCALS
The end product of (12b, iv) is (13a). The oblique reciprocal undergoes a shift to
the adjunct (second after horizon) position, as in (13b), following (13c-d). The
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The typology of categories, empty and overt (Haegeman 1991: 453) is one of the
triumphs of GB t leory. It is tight and rigorous, even predicting that one slot will be
empty (that with the conflicting components [+anaphor, +pronominal)). The only
way to add to it would be to use another feature and create a four-dimensional
matrix: [:tanaphilr], {:::I::pronominal], [:::I::overt],[:::I::X].In a way Circassian presents
a worst-case scen ario for this scheme. Circassian anaphors split in both morphology
and syntax, altho ugh they do not violate anaphor-binding conditions. This implies
that governing c,ltegory and the binding principle do not define the typology of
NPs, overt or co, ert, nor do these features determine the syntax of split anaphors. I
have argued that :he other factor entering into Circassian has been reference, but to
expand the categllry table by another dimension would be to create at least 14 slots,
and this is far toe many.
I propose thl ee emendations to the theory of categories in GB and to the Min-
imalist effort inse ,far as it maintains category theory. First, I propose anaphors and
perhaps other categories are not basic, but rather are derived from more basic
semantic and merphological processes involving symmetry breaking of semantic
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absolutive subjel:t leaves an argument, arg, trace in three place verbs because the
verb retains its aJgument structure. Similarly, the demoted subject in (13d) leaves no
trace because it i; governed by the aversive postpositional suffix, /-f-/, in contrast to
the form in (13e: where the subject has retained its normal status and the disability
is expressed thrc ugh a suffix.
(13) ShlifJling oj demoted reciprocal:
a. S- ... - reciprocal-do-trace-cause- v:
tg-qg. zara-y+ha-(a-) arg-1{a-t'g-zY g-1{a-ha[tgq;Jzl.:ro'1{at'fzf1{ox']
we-H )R-REC-3+PL-(OAT-)argumenurace-CAuS-give-back-PAST -PL
'We! ave them back to one another.'
b. do- .. -io-s-for-V:
*(Il-q;::-w-a-s-fg-t'g-zYg-1{a-ha-p[qwosfgt'izf1{ox'op]
3.PL- fOR-you-to-l-for-give-back-PAST -PL-not
1 am Ilot inclined to give them back to you.'
c. do- .. [Aors-for-]io-V:
(Il-qg-:,-fg-w-a-t'g-zY;J-1{a-ha-p[qgsfuwot'izf1{ox'op]
3.PL- fOR-me-for-you-to-give-back-PAST -PL-not
'I am not inclined to give them back to you.'
(lit.: 'For me not [to] give them back to you.')
d. do-,. -io-s-V-able- ... :
(Il-qg-'v-a-s-t'g-s'g-zYg-1{a-ha-p[qwost' us'uzf1{ax'op]
3.PL-:lOR-you-to-I -give-able-back-PAST -PL-not
'I can lot give them back to you.'
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predicates. That symmetry breaking may be fundamental to language can be seen
from the contrast between language and symbol. Language conveys predicates and
predicates relate one argument to another in some precedence, "X does V to Y" ,or
"X Vs Y". By contrast symbols have symmetry; any predicates come afterward as
inferences on the part of the perceiver. Second, I propose that symmetry breaking
processes can show language specific ordering. These processes interface with ba-
sic syntactic principles for retrieving reference, but in complex ways. Third, and
more profoundly, I propose that for at least some languages morphology will take
precedence over syntax, particularly in those cases where semantic derivations are
at work to force morphological patterns into differentiated forms.
My suggestions may prove wrong under further scrutiny, but the inadequacy of
category theory, specifically of anaphor theory, was self-evident back when I first
looked at Circassian. Circassian anaphors were a forceful counter-example then,
and remain so now, even with a small theory to go with them. They could only have
been dismissed as cognitive discord, with one theorist taking them to be syntacti-
cal and the other as morphological, though as an interpretive issue no resolution
would have been possible. They were not anomalies; they did not lie beyond the
theory; they were clearly anaphors. Clearly they were an aberration; they were not
expected. They might have been construed as evidence for lacunae in the canonical
theory, save for the fact that there was no evident way to accommodate them to that
theory: the anaphors were part of an array of nouns, pronouns, and various traces
that resulted from the binary interplay of features. To add another feature would
have been to produce clutter in the table with most new forms exhibiting absences,
that is, no possible confirmation. A formalist accommodation might merely have
marked them as odd deviations in some parameter, but a causalist instinct would
have sensed that they offered insight into an aspect of grammar. In this causalist
sense they were an antinomy to the canonical anaphors and any theory explain-
ing them would necessarily be antagonistic: it would replace in part or in whole
the canonical theory. The canonical theory had had substantial corroboration for its
treatment of anaphors; it could not fail for lack of evidence. The canonical theory
was also correctly reasoned given its premises. The logical rigour of that theory
rendered it incapable of accommodating Circassian. The only solution was to seek
a more profound level of explanation of which the canonical theory was in some
way derivative.
In fact, it was this elegance of logic that made the split anaphors of Circassian
important: They were that most vital of findings: they were counter-examples. They
showed the canonical theory to be wrong in fact. A counter-example has force
entirely by virtue of being a counter-example to a theory. With an accompanying
alternative paradigm it is more useful, but not more forceful. Counter-examples are
to be heeded, not construed as theoretical orphans.
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